The Illusion of Regime Survival Through a Limited War: Khamenei’s Miscalculation and the Looming Collapse

Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, seems to have concluded that if a war with the United States or Israel were to occur, it would not result in a full-scale ground invasion but rather a limited conflict involving aerial and missile strikes. His experience observing wars in the region over the past two decades has led him to believe that the U.S. has little appetite for deploying ground forces and instead prefers remote, surgical operations targeting infrastructure and military facilities. Based on this belief, Khamenei assumes that if he can suppress internal unrest through his extensive security apparatus and preserve the core of his power structure, the Islamic Republic will not only survive but emerge from the war with renewed legitimacy and strength. He believes that, under wartime conditions, he can fully securitize the domestic environment, suppress any form of dissent under the pretext of “unity against foreign aggression,” and—after the war ends—blame all of Iran’s chronic dysfunctions, including the water, power, and gas shortages, inflation, and economic collapse, on the foreign enemy. In his view, war would be an opportunity to purge opposition, consolidate power, and redirect public attention away from the regime’s longstanding failures. What Khamenei fails to recognize, however, is that the current situation is fundamentally different from any past conflict—and that this time, the Islamic Republic may not survive. Western military capabilities have evolved to such an extent that they can cripple Iran’s core infrastructure with extraordinary precision in the early hours of any conflict. The command centers of the IRGC, intelligence headquarters, missile sites, and communication hubs have all been carefully mapped over the years. Unlike the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted for years and cost hundreds of thousands of lives, this time the objective won’t be territorial occupation—it will be the decapitation of the regime’s command-and-control system. The United States and its allies don’t need boots on the ground; disabling the leadership structure is enough to plunge the state into disarray. More importantly, Iranian society today bears no resemblance to that of the 1980s. The people are neither ideologically motivated nor willing to sacrifice for the regime. Years of economic hardship, repression, corruption, and injustice have left society deeply exhausted and ready to explode. If a war breaks out, instead of rallying behind the regime, people are far more likely to rise up against it. Public rage, long simmering beneath the surface, could erupt into widespread urban uprisings. In such a scenario, the regime’s security apparatus will likely be overwhelmed; the scale and intensity of unrest would go far beyond anything it could contain. From an economic perspective, the Islamic Republic is in no position to endure a war. Existing sanctions have already pushed Iran’s economy to the edge of collapse. If key oil, industrial, or energy infrastructure is targeted during the conflict, the economy could completely disintegrate. Disruptions in the supply of food, water, fuel, and electricity could unravel social order in a matter of days. At that point, no rhetoric—neither anti-American slogans nor appeals to national pride—will pacify the public. A starving and desperate society does not listen. Khamenei also mistakenly assumes that he can count on support from Russia and China. In reality, Russia is already overstretched by the war in Ukraine, and China, engaged in a high-stakes global economic competition, is unlikely to risk confrontation with the West over Iran. When the moment of truth arrives, the Islamic Republic may find itself completely isolated. Perhaps most critically, the regime faces a looming succession crisis. Khamenei is old and reportedly in poor health. There is no clear or widely accepted successor. In a wartime scenario, should he die or become incapacitated, the regime would be plunged into a leadership vacuum, leading to further instability. Neither the IRGC nor any other institution has the legitimacy or cohesion to manage the country in his absence. Khamenei looks to Bashar al-Assad’s survival in Syria as a model for his own strategy, but Iran is not Syria. Iranian society is far more complex, politically aware, and less willing to accept authoritarian rule. His vision of a “manageable war” is not a sound political strategy—it is a dangerous delusion. This time, the war he seeks to manipulate as a lifeline could well be the trigger that ends the Islamic Republic once and for all. The people won’t rally behind him, the world won’t tolerate him, and even parts of his own system may no longer obey him. And this time, unlike before, he may not survive.